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I.   INTRODUCTION
Liberalism, both contemporary and classical, rests at heart on a
theory of human nature, and at the center of that theory lies one core
commitment: all human beings, qua human beings, are essentially
rational. There are two equally important implications. The first we
might call the “universalist” assumption: all human beings, not just
some, are rational—not just white people, men, freemen, property
owners, aristocrats, or citizens, but all of us. In this central, defining
respect, then, we are all the same: we all share in this universal,
natural, human trait. The second implication, we might call the “in-
dividualist” assumption: because each one of us is rational, each one
of us is not only competent to, but best-equipped to formulate and act
on his or her own individually held conception of the good life. We are
each capable of deciding for ourselves what to think, believe, and do
within the sphere of self-regarding behavior. We all share in this ca-
pacity equally. Whatever may be our otherwise terribly and radically
unequal endowments, we share equally the capacity to decide for
ourselves what is our own best conception of our individual self, fu-
ture, and interests.1
Over the last fifty years of American constitutional law, this lib-
eral conception of our nature has provided the foundation for a dis-
tinctly liberal legalist understanding of two of our most central con-
stitutional rights—equal protection and due process. First, at least
since Brown v. Board of Education2 the universalist interpretation of
human nature has grounded a particular conception of the equality
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Liberalism holds that we
are all in some essential way the same. Accordingly, equality law in
the post-Brown era holds that we must be treated the same, unless a
                                                                                                                   
*    Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This Article is the published
version of the 1997 Mason Ladd Lecture delivered at the Florida State University College of
Law.
1. See RONALD DWORKIN, Liberalism and Justice, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 179,
188-204 (1985); ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118,
131-34 (1970). These may be the best modern statements of the universalist and individu-
alist assumptions at the heart of contemporary liberalism.
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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case can be made for the rationality of various distinctions between
us. In this sense, equality law and the rights it entails are all about
what follows from our universality. Second, the rationalist conception
of human nature, over roughly the same time period, has been at the
heart of a particular interpretation of the liberty guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment: we are all rational and equally capable of
ascertaining what for us would be a good life. At least since Griswold
v. Connecticut,3 the liberty we are promised gives us the right to do
precisely that, unimpeded by the state. Liberty law in a post-
Griswold liberal legal conception is, in this sense, the bundle of
rights that are entailed by our universally shared but radically dif-
ferentiating rationality.4 In the last forty years or so, the constitu-
tional law governing our liberty has been about the scope of our
negative liberty to be and do what we want. More bluntly, it is about
what has come to be called “the right to be left alone.”
There can be no doubt that this liberal understanding of our na-
ture, and the wide range and bewildering variety of interpretations
of constitutional rights and norms that it undergirds, have prompted
moments of very real moral progress over the course of the second
half of this century. Surely it is fair to say that the acknowledgment
of our universality lying at the heart of so much of Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence over the last forty years has not only
prompted the creation of a more equal and free society, but has also
enabled us to at least glimpse the expansive and inclusive commu-
nity that is equality’s natural complement. The Court’s overruling of
Plessey v. Ferguson5 in Brown, the various sex equality cases from
the 1970s,6 and the current Court’s recent decision in Romer v. Ev-
ans7 all rest at the heart of the profoundly liberal and universalist
claim that what we share is what makes us human. It is by virtue of
our commonality that the state must accord all of us, without regard
to race, sex, or sexuality, equal protection of the law and the dignity
and respect that it entails. The common message of these great lib-
eral cases is that it is, at root, our commonality—our shared, univer-
sal nature—that implies that laws segregating some of us from oth-
ers, or denying some but not others civic duties and responsibilities,
or denying some but not others access to the levers of political
change, are unconstitutional. These decisions have given us not only
a more just legal order, but a larger and more moral community as
well.
                                                                                                                   
3. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
4. See RONALD DWORKIN, The Moral Reading and the Majoritarian Premise, in
FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1, 21-26 (1996).
5. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
6. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
7. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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Likewise, in decisions over roughly the same time period, the
thoroughly liberal acknowledgment of our individual capacity for ra-
tionality has inspired dramatic expansions of our liberty. First, the
Court’s early insistence on the parent’s right to educate his child as
he sees fit,8 and then its insistence in Griswold, Eisenstadt v. Baird,9
Roe v. Wade,10 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey11 on the individual’s
right to decide for oneself how, whether, and when to parent all rest
at heart on the quintessential liberal and rationalist claim that we
are each capable of and must be free to formulate our own fallible re-
sponses to life’s deepest mysteries, and must therefore be free of the
state’s meddling desire to do it for us. Because of these constitutional
developments over the last fifty years, we, as a culture, are more
aware than our ancestors were of our shared universal nature and of
the demands that universality places upon the state, the community,
and the law. Because of these developments, we, as a culture, are
more free than they were to decide individually how to live our inti-
mate and private lives, and on which predicated set of beliefs. We are
also more free than our ancestors were to make these decisions ra-
tionally and by our own lights and chosen goals rather than acqui-
esce in the presumed imperatives of state, community, tradition, na-
ture, or fate.
There can also be no doubt, however, that these revolutionary, ex-
pansive, and liberal changes in our self-understanding have left seri-
ous difficulties in their wake, as scores of critics of liberalism and of
legal liberalism, in particular, have made clear over the last thirty
years or so. I will focus on what strikes me as the two most intracta-
ble problems. First, pointed challenges to the liberal legalists’ com-
mitment to universalism have come from a range of identity theo-
rists, activists, and indeed, entire peoples. The question, or chal-
lenge, posed to liberalism by this eclectic collection of critics is essen-
tially this: is it really true, as the liberal seems to believe as an arti-
cle of faith, that the flame of inclusion in a hegemonic community,
defined by universally shared human traits, is worth the lost candle
of identity or distinctiveness a particular subcommunity or culture
may be asked to sacrifice?12 Does the African American community
                                                                                                                   
8. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
9. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
12. See generally DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE (1987) (exploring through allegory why racial inequality has yet to be
achieved in the United States); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) (critiquing feminist legal theorists who posit a univer-
sal women’s experience because it works to subvert and erase the experience of women of
different races, classes, and sexual orientation); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Ac-
cent, Antidiscrimination Law and Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J.
1329 (1991) (arguing that linguistic tolerance should be a goal of the law and offering a
708 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:705
sacrifice too much when in the name of liberalism it integrates its
strongest members out of the black community and into the enclaves
of privilege, all so as to honor a shared universal nature that tran-
scends race? Does liberal feminism hold, as its many detractors
claim, to a false and patriarchal ideal, betraying women, if it aims to
do nothing more than increase the number of “women in suits.” What
will happen to gay and lesbian culture, to say nothing of queer the-
ory, when it is no longer queer to be queer? Should we, or when
should we, forego the securities, strengths, and challenges of our dis-
tinctive identities for the allure of the community’s universalistic
embrace? If what distinguishes us is oftentimes as dear and precious
as what we share, then the justice of liberalism’s admonition to
forego particularity for the sake of our universality is not so clear. If
there are costs involved in accepting the liberal’s promise of univer-
sality—costs to our sacrificed distinguishing identities—we need to
assess what those costs are. We cannot assume them away by blindly
holding onto the preemptive moral importance of our shared human
traits as an article of faith.
Equally poignant challenges to the individualist side of liberalism,
and hence the libertarian thrust of our constitutional law of liberty
and substantive due process, have come from communitarians, rela-
tional feminists, and various Marxist scholars. The common question
posed, in many different ways, by this group of critics who otherwise
have little or nothing in common is something like the following: is
the flame of individual freedom (to stick with my original metaphor)
worth the candle of community, of connection, of relation, of the ethic
of care, and of the responsibilities and duties to others it implies,
that may have to be sacrificed to insure it?13 To put it in selfish
terms, does my “right to be left alone” come at too high of a cost to my
need not to be? We have a right to be left alone, but needs that can
only be met interdependently. For example, we have rights to birth
control and early trimester abortions, but grossly unmet needs for
quality, publicly funded childcare. Has the right to the former, per-
haps, made it more rather than less difficult to meet the need for the
latter? Similarly, we have a right, perhaps, to die—or at least promi-
nent liberal legal theorists are now arguing as much—but what we
                                                                                                                   
reinterpretation of Title VII to address the subordination of linguistic difference); Mari J.
Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987) (stating that Critical Legal Studies should look to the experience of
non-whites in reconstructing legal concepts and strategies); Robin West, Jurisprudence
and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988) (arguing that conceptions of “human nature” in
modern jurisprudence are untrue of women’s lives).
13. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996); PLURALISM, JUSTICE, AND EQUALITY (David Miller & Michael
Walzer eds., 1995); MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY
(1993).
1998]                         UNIVERSALISM ET AL. 709
desperately need is quality, publicly funded health care. Might the
gain of the right to die make more, rather than less, difficult the
campaign to meet the need for the latter? No doubt, we have a right
to educate our children in our own home, in private schools, in any
language we please, with our own money, and by our own lights
away from the prying eye of the state, but what our children need is
a decent and civic education. When put more altruistically, the com-
munitarian’s complaint is, if anything, even more pressing: does my
right to be left alone come at too high of a cost to my civic responsi-
bilities to others? Does my right to ignore the panhandler on the
street—to avert my eyes, keep my wallet in my pocket, and preserve
my private space—come at too high of a sacrifice to my responsibility
and my civic duties to help others in need? We have a right to be left
alone, but both a need for and an obligation to engage in civic, public,
deliberative life. If our rights of self-deliberation, self-creation, and
self-control, all justified and grounded in our presumed rationality,
come to threaten our needs for others and our responsibilities and
duties toward them, then we need to assess whether the gain is
worth the cost. We cannot assume that the question answers itself,
or that the context within which any particular trade-off arises might
not make a difference.
The alternatives to liberalism, however, are not particularly pal-
atable. Identity theorists and their legions of followers need to criti-
cally rethink the politics, policies, ethics, and societies that follow
from a denial of universalism. To reverse the questions posed above:
do we really want, in the name of the integrity of identity, a confed-
eration of separatist communities with ethnic houses for every eth-
nicity, not only on college campuses but in the larger society as well,
with the culture balkanized and the state bosnianized, with our dif-
ferences both emphasized and infinitely subdivided?
Communitarians also need to tread carefully. What politics will,
in practice, follow from a denial of the radical rationalist individual-
ism so squarely at the heart of not only modern liberal theory but of
contemporary American life? Do we want a return to the constrained
choices of the past in our intimate lives, where young girls face man-
datory heterosexuality, back-alley abortions, shotgun weddings, and
loveless marriages, where divorce is hard to come by, and child rais-
ing—an ennobling profession for some, but a life of drudgery for oth-
ers—is mandated by fate for all? Likewise, as much as we may le-
gitimately worry about the tethering of our bonds of civic engage-
ment, do we really want to embrace a world in which such engage-
ment displaces independent thought? As much as we may legiti-
mately worry, for example, that the independent schools movement
siphons the best students and parents from public schools, and
weakens considerably the bonds of democracy and community, do we
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really want them abolished? Can we even envision, much less en-
dorse, the monotonous, hegemonic conformity that might very well
follow on the heels of a serious attack on liberal individualism?
For me, these questions are rhetorical. The answer to all is no.
The motivating impulses of both the identity theorists’ and the com-
munitarians’ critiques of liberalism are understandable, but the po-
litical implications of a full-scale rejection of fundamental liberal
norms are unacceptable in the end. This Essay will explore the pos-
sibility of a mid-way correction, rather than rejection, of liberalism,
so as to meet at least some of the objections posed by identity theo-
rists and communitarians respectively. We need to reconstruct liber-
alism in order to take into account the meaning and weight of these
objections without losing the thread of its motivating impulse.
Generally, I propose that liberalism fails to take seriously the dif-
ferences between groups of people, as identity theorists claim, and
the interconnections and interdependencies of all of us, as communi-
tarians insist, and that the failure to do so has had a profound and
negative effect on our constitutional law and rhetoric. I suggest it has
significantly undermined the classic liberal arguments for many of
our most vulnerable and controversial contemporary liberal rights
and entitlements. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to jettison either
the universalist or individualist aspirations of liberalism, or the lib-
eral legal defenses of the vital and embattled rights that tenuously
follow from those assumptions. Rather, in theory, a friendly amend-
ment to liberalism’s core convictions is needed. While we share a
universal nature, some traits differentiate some of us from the rest of
us. While we are in some aspects of our lives individuals first and
foremost, we are also interconnected in comparably profound ways to
and with others. In liberal constitutional practice and doctrine, we
need to recognize that the animating core commitments of liberalism
provide, at most, a necessary but insufficient condition for many of
the rights that have proven to be most vulnerable today. Where a
group seeking a right is different in some way—for example, differ-
ently vulnerable to the harms that flow from sexual assault, or dif-
ferently committed to child-raising, or differently vulnerable to hate
speech—what is needed is a showing that the harms occasioned by
sexual assault and hate speech are real and demand a response, or
that child-raising is a vital human activity and demands greater
communal support. Similarly, where an individual right of self-
governance impacts social, intimate, or structural connections be-
tween persons, as they almost invariably do, we need to show that
the interaction is for the good: that abortion rights strengthen the
community and the family despite the severance of the connection
between mother and fetus; or that birth control, abortion rights, or
same-sex marriages would constitute an improvement in, not a
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threat to, the bonds of tradition tying our modern institution of fam-
ily to our history and our larger society. I am certain a commitment
to liberalism, universalism, and individualism is necessary to provide
a floor for these arguments; without such a commitment, there is just
no reason for these arguments to be heard, much less honored or
heeded. However, a liberal commitment to universality or individu-
alism provides only the floor because it is not sufficient to make the
case for virtually any of our modern rights. In addition, an insistence
on these commitments, if it blinds us to the differences and intercon-
nections that also define us, will ultimately frustrate rather than fur-
ther our attempts to articulate such a case.
In the last section of this Essay, I will attempt to apply my
friendly amendment to liberal legalism to the current debates swirl-
ing around the problem and promise of same-sex marriage. I will ar-
gue, in brief, that the more or less standard liberal arguments for gay
marriage are flawed in the ways described above. They relentlessly
deny morally salient differences between gay and straight sexuality
and same-sex and opposite-sex marriage, and they relentlessly deny
the essentially communitarian, rather than individualistic, nature of
the institution of marriage itself. In so doing, they not only threaten
to win the battle but lose the war by securing an entitlement to gay
marriage with an argument that carries a potential for very real
backfiring, but they also incur a substantial opportunity cost. The
best case for same-sex marriage is one that underscores not only the
universality of gay and straight culture, but also the salient differ-
ences between them and the interdependencies, rather than the
independency, of human individuals. By insisting upon those differ-
ences and their moral significance we may not only better secure the
human rights of this substantial subcommunity among us, but we
may immeasurably strengthen the institution of marriage, which de-
spite its many and heralded flaws, continues to enrich the lives of
many of us.
II.   EQUALITY
Liberalism rests, again, on the defining conviction that all human
beings, by virtue of being human, share an essential nature, and that
it is by virtue of that commonality that they are entitled to equal
treatment, dignity, and respect. From this conception of our nature,
liberal constitutional lawyers have implied a particular interpreta-
tion of equality and of the constitutional mandate for equal protec-
tion. According to liberal legalists, the liberal state must treat
equally people who are the same. Consequently, the constitution de-
mands that the courts correct cognitive mistakes when reviewing the
state’s work. If a state legislature sees a difference where there is
none, then the court is justified in striking down the legislation based
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on that faulty premise. Armed with this logic, the United States Su-
preme Court has, over the last fifty years, struck en masse an entire
regime of Jim Crow statutes that treated blacks differently than
whites,14 a goodly number of so-called “Jane Crow” statutes that
treated women differently than men,15 and a host of other bits and
pieces of legislation that have, on occasion, irrationally differentiated
illegitimate from legitimate children,16 immigrants from citizens,17
and even the poor from the rich,18 depending on the right or entitle-
ment at stake. This liberal understanding of equality, to repeat, has
been a source of substantial moral progress over the course of the
last fifty years.
However, the liberal understanding of equality has simultane-
ously been the source of moral regression. At least one of the reasons,
albeit not the only one, is that its core logic—we are all essentially
the same and, therefore, must be treated the same—inclines the lib-
eral to vastly overstate the degree of our uniformity, and nearly
blinds him to the extent of our differences and to the moral signifi-
cance of these differences. Race, to take only the most obvious exam-
ple (liberal protestations to the contrary notwithstanding), is not only
skin deep. It is not the case that the only difference between me and
my African American colleagues or students is the utterly contin-
gent, trivial, and morally insignificant one of skin color, and that in
all other respects we are essentially the same. The difference of race,
both real and consequential, is that African Americans are, very
likely, descended from slaves, and I, very likely, am not. That differ-
ence suggests others, equally real and consequential. She has, very
likely, suffered by virtue of her ancestry, and I, very likely, have
not.19 This difference matters. It determines to a large measure dif-
ferences in our opportunities, our vulnerabilities, our sensitivities,
our interests, and our needs. By insisting on universality, the liberal
understanding of equality undermines the logic of Jim Crow, but just
as clearly, by denying or diminishing the magnitude of our differ-
ence, the liberal legalist undermines the logic of affirmative action. It
                                                                                                                   
14. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954).
15. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Caban v. Mo-
hammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
16. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977);
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
17. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
18. See Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist.
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
19. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
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is now argued by scores of critical race theorists that the conse-
quences of that denial have been nothing short of disastrous.20
The same pattern, and the same limitations, beset liberal and lib-
eral feminist attempts to right historical and ongoing wrongs against
women. By insisting on the shared universality of male and female
nature, and then building rights of nondiscrimination on that foun-
dation, liberal and liberal feminist constitutionalists have achieved
major victories parallel to those in the area of race. They have un-
dermined a Jane Crow regime that denied rights and responsibilities
to women on the grounds of their intellectual and moral inferiority.21
However, by virtue of precisely that commitment to universality, lib-
erals and liberal feminists have also felt compelled to deny or dimin-
ish important differences,22 such as women’s different biological role
in reproduction and the scores of differentiating needs that difference
in turn entails; 23 women’s different and greater vulnerability to rape,
harassment, and sexual assault;24 women’s differential embrace of
stereotypically “feminine” rather than masculine ways of self-
presentation;25 women’s different perceptions of and reactions to sex
and violence;26 women’s different degree of interdependency and in-
                                                                                                                   
20. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, Each Other’s Harvest: Diversity’s Deeper Mean-
ing, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 757 (1997) (arguing that diversity is an essential tool for eradicating
racism).
21. See Wendy W. Williams, Notes from a First Generation, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 99,
110-11 (1989).
22. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, On Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimi-
nation, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32 (1987) (critiquing lib-
eral feminism’s adherence to equality as sameness).
23. See Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279,
1326-27 (1987) (arguing that the workplace should not treat women’s biological difference
punitively, but should render it costless by not depriving pregnant women of money,
status, and opportunity); Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 327 (1984-
85) (advocating that the legal treatment of illness and disability should be readjusted to
accommodate pregnant workers, thus guaranteeing women’s equality in the workplace).
24. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986) (arguing that masculine
conceptions of violence and self defense have skewed rape law against women’s interests).
But see KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS 89-90
(1993) (“Rules and laws based on the premise that all women need protection from all men,
because they are so much weaker, serve only to reinforce the image of women as power-
less.”).
25. See, e.g., Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender From Sex and Sexual Orien-
tation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 3-4
(1995) (arguing that Title VII should, if correctly applied, provide protection against the
discrimination of effeminate men for exhibiting characteristics associated with femininity).
26. See, e.g., Estrich, supra note 24.
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volvement with infants and small children;27 and, arguably, women’s
different ways of thinking, feeling, and caring for others.28
The quintessential liberal-legalistic denial of difference in both
the areas of race and sex have had two pernicious consequences, one
of which has been detailed in critical race and critical feminist legal
literature. The second consequence has been relatively neglected.
The first is its potential for backlash. In the race context, the appro-
priation of liberal, universalistic norms by opponents of affirmative
action over the last ten years or so may best exemplify the problem,
but the seeds of both the denial and the harm it would cause were
present early on. In Brown, the force of liberal legal logic relegated
the evidence of difference, as well as its moral significance, to a foot-
note.29 Had that difference—the differential harmful effect of de jure
segregation on the minds and self esteem of school children—been
centralized in the text of the opinion, rather than marginalized in a
footnote, our constitutional law governing race relations might look
very different today. If we had been clearer from the outset that the
trigger of constitutional intervention into the state’s affairs on mat-
ters of race is not just differential treatment in the face of universal-
ity, but the differential and greater suffering by African Americans
as a result of our differing histories, then not only might the case for
affirmative action, as indicated, have been more straightforward and
less riddled with paradox, but the case for the constitutionality of
laws criminalizing hate speech might look very different. The segre-
gatory law or ordinance, on such a view, is a paradigm example not
of an irrational classification on the basis of a “trivial” distinction,
but rather a paradigm example of hate speech.30 The segregatory law
or ordinance is harmful, and so harmful as to be unconstitutional,
because of its differentiating effects on the radically different sensi-
bilities of African American and majority citizens.31
In the sex or gender context, the liberal insistence on the essential
sameness of men and women, or the triviality of any differences, has
also caused real harm and threatens to cause more. Part of the harm
is the diversion of resources. Rather than strive to change the con-
tent of law so that it meets the needs and respects the experiences of
                                                                                                                   
27. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1
S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 133 (1992) (advocating a preference for maternal defer-
ence in child custody cases).
28. See, e.g., MARY FIELD BELENKY ET AL., WOMEN’S WAYS OF KNOWING: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SELF, VOICE, AND MIND (1986) (examining women’s ways of knowing);
Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 810-11 (1989).
29. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).
30. See Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech
on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 439-41 (1990) (positing that Brown v. Board of Education
can be read as regulating the content of racist speech and, in turn, as an exception to the
general rule that content regulations are unconstitutional).
31. See id.
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women, effort is directed toward the end of rendering the law neu-
tral. For example, the standard of reasonableness defining provoca-
tion in criminal law reduces the charge of a man who murders his
wife from murder to manslaughter if he harbors a suspicion, whether
or not well-grounded, that she engaged in adultery. Rather than
change the content of the standard of “reasonableness,” liberal legal-
ism directs us toward the end of ensuring that this standard remains
unchanged, gender-neutral, and thereby reduces a woman’s murder
of her husband to manslaughter under similar circumstances.32 The
obvious fact that this standard of reasonable behavior—that even a
“reasonable person” might be provoked to kill his wife if he thinks
she slept with another man—reflects a norm held by some men, per-
haps, but very few women. This results in the exculpation of many
men for the killing of their wives and almost no women for killing
their husbands, and, accordingly, endangers many women but very
few men. These facts simply go unnoticed—and not just incidentally.
Again, it is central to liberalism to deny precisely such differences.
Similarly, the reform of rape law was retarded in this country, not
advanced, by a comparable diversion of resources. Examples of the
law’s grotesqueries are the legality of forced and violent intercourse
with one’s wife, under the so-called “marital rape exemption;” the re-
quirement that a rape victim resist a violent rape to the utmost so as
to evidence her non-consent; or the ongoing inability or refusal of
prosecutors to bring cases or secure convictions of men who have
raped acquaintances or intimates. Rather than address these grotes-
queries, liberal reform efforts were instead aimed at the outset of the
rape reform movement toward the dubious goal of making the law
neutral, to redefining rape as the nonconsensual intercourse with
another, rather than a woman, and redefining the marital rape ex-
emption as exempting the rape of one’s spouse rather than one’s wife,
to name a few.33 Again, the obvious fact that rape is overwhelmingly
a crime committed by men upon women, and that consequently,
these norms, whether or not gender neutral, overwhelmingly excul-
pate men rather than women, and endanger women but not men,
goes unnoticed, and again, not incidentally. Liberalism is at its heart
committed to not notice such differences.
Examples of this phenomenon could easily be multiplied. To cite
recent examples, rather than work to change the standards of “mas-
culinity” at Virginia Military Institute (VMI),34 West Point, the Naval
                                                                                                                   
32. For a compelling critique of heat of passion defenses on this and other grounds,
see Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense,
106 YALE L.J. 1331 (1997).
33. See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 81-82 (1987).
34. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
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Academy, or the Price Waterhouse accounting firm35 so that these in-
stitutions would be more comfortable places for vast numbers of
women, enormous effort has been put toward the goal of insuring ac-
cess to these institutions by the exceptional women who actually
comply with those masculine norms. Obviously, this allocation of re-
sources is not accidental. Liberal feminism is firmly committed to
denying the correlation between “feminine” ways of acting and
women’s behavior, and is accordingly not going to commit itself, in
the name of sex discrimination, to the eradication of “discrimination”
against the feminine.36
In some cases, however, the harm caused to women by the flat as-
sertion of sameness in the face of difference is greater than just that
of benign neglect. The insistence on the sameness of men and women
made it possible for U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Gins-
burg and others to argue, in the seventies, for the unconstitutionality
of laws that essentially permitted employed or once-employed wid-
ows, but not widowers, to “double-dip” from social security and mili-
tary benefits plans because of a presumption worked into the rele-
vant regulatory schemes that widows, but not widowers, are fully
“dependent” on their spouses.37 The insistence on the falsity of that
presumption—the denial of difference—invalidated the laws, thus
freeing us of the burden of a false stereotype, while simultaneously
having the effect of depriving widows who had been employed at
marginal or depressed wages and who were, nevertheless, dependent
on this source of income. The insistence on the sameness of men and
women with respect to reproductive and wage labor has had even
more pernicious and far-reaching negative effects on women.38 It has
tremendously burdened the effort, whether pursued through legisla-
tive or adjudicative means, of securing decent maternity leaves. If
pregnancy, childbirth, and nursing—the crux of the difference in the
reproductive labor of the sexes—are truly inconsequential differences
between men and women, then the logic of denying the different
needs of women when bearing children—needs for time away from
wage labor, and support while engaged in reproductive labor—is un-
assailable.
Again, this “backfiring” potential of a liberal or, as it is sometimes
called, “formal” conception of equality is broadly acknowledged by
                                                                                                                   
35. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
36. For the best attempt to resist this tendency, see Case, supra note 25, at 3 (“So
long as stereotypically feminine behavior, from wearing dresses and jewelry to speaking
softly or in a high-pitched voice, to nurturing or raising children, is forced into a female
ghetto, it may continue to be devalued.”).
37. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 217 (1977); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973). Justice Ginsburg argued these cases for the ACLU.
38. See Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 201,
202-09 (1987).
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feminist theorists, or at least the possibility of it is understood.39
There is also, however, a not-so-widely understood opportunity cost.
By insisting so adamantly on sameness and on the formal equality
that presumably follows from it, the liberal advocate loses the oppor-
tunity to put forward precisely those affirmative arguments for
change that might most meaningfully move the culture in a morally
desirable direction. For example, if we could acknowledge that the
case for affirmative action stems from a fundamental difference—in
the case of black and white relations, in the difference between a
slave and free ancestry—then we could begin to fashion a better un-
derstanding than we presently possess of the impact of history, both
personal and cultural, on present endowments; of the relation be-
tween the personal and cultural stories of our relatives to our present
circumstances; of the impact of a slave history on not only our indi-
vidual circumstances, but also on our perceptions and treatment of
others; and ultimately, of course, of the justice of a case for repara-
tions. It is simply not possible to make or hear such arguments in the
context of a debate framed so relentlessly around the parameters of
universality.
In the context of gender, the opportunity cost of the denial of dif-
ference is, if anything, more pronounced. We need to understand as a
culture, and we presently do not, that the macho, gunslinging, venge-
ful, provocation norm cited above is not a good norm of “reasonable-
ness” no matter how many men hold it—that no matter how taunt-
ing, teasing, “provocative,” or bitchy the behavior of one’s cuckolding
wife, it really is not reasonable to respond by killing her.40 It would
be better—certainly better for women, but also better as a matter of
civic and domestic peace, better as a matter of societal health, and
better for justice—if we were to embrace as a legal standard a norm
of reasonableness that required of cuckolded spouses’ behavior more
measured, more pacific, and considerably less violent. Similarly, we
need to understand as a culture and as teachers that the confronta-
tional and often explicitly misogynist pedagogical techniques that
characterize military training in elite and not so elite academies cre-
ate graduates unfit for leadership, or even citizenship, in a sexually
integrated society, or for that matter a sexually segregated one. It
would be better—certainly better for women, but also better as a
matter of civic and military virtue—if our norms of excellence in such
academies were moved a considerable measure toward a model that
attempts an integration of masculine and feminine strengths. The
same can be said of police forces, as the Warren Christopher commis-
sion investigating the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) in the
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aftermath of the Rodney King episode apparently concluded.41 We
need to understand as a culture, and as professionals, employers,
and lawyers, that our current norms of aggressive, backslapping,
confrontational, conquest-obsessed behavior in the legal profession
are not good norms to hold. It would be better—certainly better for
women, but also better as a matter of professionalism—if our norms
of excellence in our chosen profession similarly integrated feminine
as well as masculine ideals of justice, care, service, and advocacy.
My main point here is not to make the case for any of these con-
clusions, but to insist that they are all arguments that deserve devel-
opment, and they stand in a complicated and precarious relationship
with liberalism. On the one hand, their airing requires an unswerv-
ing commitment to liberalism; without a conviction that our shared
humanity implies equal respect, they will not be heard. However, on
the other hand, their airing is presently hampered by the liberals’
persistent denial of difference. Equality—understood as the equal
treatment of things that are the same—will not be sufficient to imply
the conclusion that a “reasonable woman” standard should be the
norm against which conduct is measured in the area of sexual har-
assment law; or that norms of reasonableness that reflect women’s
rather than men’s judgments about sex and violence should govern
the law of provocation in criminal law; or that Price Waterhouse
should not only not discriminate against the masculine woman, but
should rethink its masculine norms as they affect both men and
women; or that VMI or the LAPD should begin to teach techniques of
conflict resolution or community policing that are grounded in stereo-
typically feminine rather than masculine ways of being. Liberalism,
and the commitment to equality that it grounds, will be sufficient,
again, to exculpate the occasional wife who kills a cuckolding hus-
band, the masculine woman denied a promotion or fired from Price
Waterhouse, or the would-be female cadet denied admission to an all
male military academy. However, there is nothing in the logic of lib-
eralism or the liberal legal understanding of either equality or the
rights that it grounds, to generate even a kernel of skepticism about
the merits of any of these criminal, cultural, or behavioral norms
themselves. Equality doctrine, theory, and politics—so long as
equality is understood as grounded in perceptions of universality—is
not only insufficient to mount these challenges, but it seriously un-
dermines them as well by masking and then denying the need for
them.
Nor is it the case that a serious commitment to equality precludes
the articulation of such arguments, as liberal feminists, or formal
equality feminists, of the last twenty years have feared. It is simply
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not the case, to paraphrase from Wendy Williams’ early statement of
this idea, that we can’t have this one both ways.42 It is not the case,
in other words, that we cannot insist on our shared essential nature
with men, and also insist that the ways in which we are different
might entail differing needs, differing values, and different legal re-
sponses, all toward the end of a healthier and more functional soci-
ety. Equality, and the perception of universality on which it rests,
does not imply anything to the contrary. The false conviction that it
does involves nothing more than mistaking a shared trait—even an
essential one—with a shared identity, or even more fundamentally
mistaking a part for the whole.
I can easily list more dissimilarities than similarities of the two
kitchen chairs in front of me. One is brown, the other black. One has
vertical slats, the other horizontal. One is three feet from the back
door, the other is four feet, and so on. Most important to my baby,
one is “hers,” and the other is her brother’s. That they have these dif-
ferences, any one of which might become important given the proper
context, does not detract from what they share. That we are commit-
ted, as liberals, to an appreciation of the nature that binds us to-
gether hardly precludes us from appreciating that which differenti-
ates us. More to the point, it does not, or should not, disempower us
from the work of arguing, or at least showing, the dysfunctionality of
a racist or patriarchal social world.
III.   LIBERTY
From the rationality of the human subject, liberals have for two
hundred years reached the political and moral conclusion that the
individual’s so-called negative liberty to fashion for himself or herself
a conception of the good life, and arrange his or her life accordingly,
must be protected. In American constitutional law, again, this has
implied for liberal legal scholars one central defining argument: a
wide array of so-called “paternalistic” or “moralistic” state legislation,
such as laws that prohibit the sale or use of birth control, that crimi-
nalize the performance of an abortion on a woman who wishes one,
that require parents to send their children to schools that teach Eng-
lish, or that criminalize suicide or sodomitical sex acts are all uncon-
stitutional infringements on our liberty under the substantive Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such laws violate, as
it is variously put, our “right to be left alone,” or our “privacy.” They
are at odds with the fundamental, defining liberal conviction that
each of us is rational and, accordingly, best able to decide for our-
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selves when and whom to marry, whether to have children and how
to educate them, with whom to have sex, and when to die.
Ronald Dworkin and a number of other liberal and liberal legal
philosophers have recently urged the U.S. Supreme Court to accept
this argument as dispositive in the so-called right to die cases:43 the
patient and only the patient, not the state, has the ability to decide
for himself or herself when and how to die, and the patient and only
the patient, not the state, should therefore have the power to make
that decision.44 As I will discuss in the next section, liberals and lib-
eral legalists hope to urge a variant on this same argument upon the
Court in an array of potential cases involving the constitutionality of
laws prohibiting same-sex marriage: the individual and only the in-
dividual, not the state, has the ability to decide for himself or herself
whom to marry and with whom to have sex, and the individual and
only the individual, not the state, should therefore have the power to
make that decision.45
In my view, there are many difficulties with this core liberal le-
galist conviction that the Fourteenth Amendment protects negative
rather than positive liberties. Here, I want to make a more internal
and more friendly critique that roughly parallels the claims made
above with regard to the liberal commitment to equality. The prob-
lem with the liberal understanding of liberty, and the liberal legal
argument against paternalistic regulation that it is routinely held to
imply, is that it inclines the liberal, and the liberal legal advocate, to
assert a degree of individualist isolation, independence, and even so-
ciopathological alienation from others that is simply untrue to the
facts, and untrue in at least three distinct ways. First, and most ob-
viously, it is rarely truly the individual, in splendid isolation, that is
protected in his right to engage in truly self-regarding conduct. There
is simply very little conduct that fits that description: riding a motor-
cycle without a helmet negatively affects both taxpayers and insur-
ance-premium payers. As Anita Allen eloquently argues, so-called
“recreational drug use,” the now-fashionable cause celebre of aca-
demic libertarians, can hardly be regarded as self-regarding once we
acknowledge the devastating destruction such behavior more than
occasionally wreaks upon family members, friends, and communi-
ties.46 In addition, surrogacy contracts, at least some of the time, in-
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flict serious harm not only upon the participants, but also upon the
siblings and relatives of both families involved. Whatever conduct
does fit the description of being truly self-regarding—thumbsucking,
nailbiting, or the personal hygiene habits of David Thoreau in the
woods of Walden—will almost certainly not be the subject of serious
or consequential legislation.
For the vast majority of cases that fall within the substantive due
process net of the last fifty years or so, the “right to be left alone,” or
the right of “privacy” protected by the liberty prong of the due proc-
ess clause, has involved not the right of the individual to do whatever
he wants in isolation, but rather the right of the individual to form
families, free of the intervention of the state.47 The “right of privacy”
is really, if we look at the subject matter of the case law, the right to
marry, to have or not have children, and to have them educated as
one sees fit. It is, in effect, the privacy, the isolation, and the liberty
of family units that is protected, not so much the privacy, isolation,
or liberty of individuals. Individuals do not exist in isolation from
each other within a family. Rather, families put individuals together.
Privacy cases, liberal rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding, do
not by any stretch protect the isolated liberty right of individuals “to
be left alone.” They protect the right of individuals to form independ-
ent societies of interaction with select others, within which the state
will not intrude.
Second, the liberal legal construction of privacy and liberty rights
as stemming from the individual’s right to be left alone tends to deny
the impact of these expansions of individual liberty on societal struc-
tures external to the particular family or individual himself. Obvi-
ously, the individual’s decision to ingest birth control pills chemically
affects no one but herself. The individual’s decision to marry someone
of a different race directly affects no one but herself and potential
spouse. The individual’s decision to home school his children in a
language and religion of his own choosing primarily affects his chil-
dren. But surely, at least in retrospect, it should now be obvious that
the freedom of the individual to marry interracially has had profound
societal effects. To whatever degree—and I suspect it may have been
substantial—the moral point of the institution of marriage in a racist
society with a slave past was once, at least in part, about preserving
racial purity, it is no longer. This no doubt has both fueled the de-
mise of any so-called moral justification for a racially segregated so-
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ciety, and contributed to the redefinition of marriage as an institu-
tion serving individual rather than communitarian needs.
The freedom of the individual to take birth control pills has had
similarly profound societal effects. Effective birth control severs the
connection between heterosexuality and reproduction, creating a
vastly larger space within which individuals can regard their sexual
lives as affective or recreational. In turn, this may have contributed,
as many conservatives and some feminists have argued, to a male
flight from familial and paternal responsibility for their offspring. It
may also have triggered, at least in part, a redefinition of marriage,
toward a union serving primarily affective ends and only secondarily
reproductive ends. Such a redefinition would hardly be inconsequen-
tial. Finally, the freedom of parents to school their children as they
please, in any language and in any religion, has had an impact on
and continues to impact our understanding of public education as an
integral aspect of civic life, the funding of such a public education,
and the capacities of individuals privately schooled, in splendid isola-
tion from central expression of the democratic impulse, to engage in
civic life.
Finally, the liberal legalist tends to deny the communitarian
rather than individualistic nature of the very institutions that she
seeks to protect—primarily marriage and the family, but others as
well. The decision of the individual to marry or begin a family is not
on par with the individual’s decision to pursue graduate education, to
travel around the world, or to buy a Honda Accord. Unlike the latter,
it is a decision that transforms, among much else, the nature of the
deciding individual. As Milton Regan has argued in a number of fora,
when marriage is well-functioning, it creates a context of individual
decision-making that is profoundly non-egoistic, and within which, in
fact, the egoistic decision-making characteristic of robust individual-
ism is perverse and even dysfunctional.48
Now, I want to make four critical observations about the denial of
connection at the heart of the rationalist side of liberalism. First, the
liberal’s denial of the social reality of the unisolated family individual
has done real harm to the individuals, or at least some of the indi-
viduals, that liberalism purports to serve. What is created through
the delegation of privacy to the family, in the name of individual
autonomy, is not necessarily individual freedom, but at least for
many, its opposite: a Hobbesian state of nature, within which the
strong control, by virtue of their superior strength, and the weak,
Stockholm-syndrome-like, learn to comply. For some, the promise of
“family privacy” becomes, in reality, not individual autonomy, but a
rationale for state indifference towards a nasty, brutish, and short
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life.49 For the losers in this delegation of authority, as Reva Siegel
has shown in her study of the 100-year history of the privacy doctrine
and family violence, state intervention into the privacy of the family
would be a substantial improvement over the status quo.50 Liberal-
ism’s denial of the communal nature of the institution it protects has
badly obscured that central truth.51
Second, and as Jana Singer has argued, the denial of the commu-
nitarian nature of the family and of marriage has resulted, among
much else, in the transformation of family law from a branch of pub-
lic law into a branch of private law within which parenting is con-
strued as the exercise of consumer choice among an array of social,
natural, or technological reproductive possibilities.52 Further, mar-
riage is seen as the equivalent of a long term contract for labor, con-
sortium, and sexual services. Obligations and rights—including the
right to end a marriage and the terms by which dissolution will take
place—are decided, under this individualized conception, in accor-
dance with whatever preferences and choices the contracting indi-
viduals brought to fruition in their agreement, not by reference to
understandings societally shared and publicly imposed.53 There are
many reasons and many problems with this reorientation of our un-
derstanding of the family and the law that governs it. However, there
can be little question that the commitment of liberals and liberal le-
galists to the peculiar proposition that the sphere of negative liberty
protecting self-regarding conduct includes the deeply other-regarding
realm of familial decision-making is a part of that story.
Third, specifically by virtue of the denial of connection, the argu-
ments for liberty rights based on such a flimsy foundation contain
the seeds of their own destruction. They are perversely easy to de-
construct, and the deconstruction has the potential to cause real
damage, particularly to the persons on whose behalf the claims were
initially made. Where the case for liberty turns so crucially on its in-
sularity, or lack of consequence, then the demonstration—sometimes
difficult, but sometimes quite straightforward—that the behavior has
consequences will radically destabilize the right. If, for example, our
right to consume pornography in the privacy of our own home54 turns
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on the Millian liberal argument55 that such consumption carries no ill
effects for anyone other than those who have consented to its manu-
facture, purchase, or use, then even the allegation, much less the
demonstration, that such consumption causes not only attitudinal
but behavioral changes that endanger women’s lives, will drastically
destabilize the right, as it already has. If the right to engage in pros-
titution, enter surrogacy contracts, or to take drugs is similarly
grounded in a right to do what one wishes with one’s body where no
other persons are affected, those rights will also become similarly
unstable in the face of a credible showing of their consequentiality.
Such a showing is rarely difficult to make. If these rights are worth
having, a defense of them on the grounds that the behavior they pro-
tect is inconsequential for anyone other than the primary actor is a
peculiarly weak one.
Let me elaborate on this point with just one particularly impor-
tant example. If the right to procure an abortion turns on the liber-
ally understood right to control one’s own body, or to be left alone, or
to make moral decisions about self-regarding conduct, and therefore
on the inconsequentiality, immateriality, or inhumanity of fetal life,
then that right will become unstable in the face of even the bald as-
sertion of the humanity of fetal life, and hence the consequentiality
to others of the decision to abort. We are, by virtue of sonograms, in-
trauterine photographs, and ultrasound imagery, no less than by vir-
tue of pro-life placards and Silent Scream videos, living in an age in
which the humanity of fetal life is increasingly palpable to increasing
numbers of people. If the pro-choice movement can learn anything at
all in the wake of the debacle occasioned by the debate over partial-
birth abortions, it should be that the argument for the right to abort
based solely on the inconsequentiality of this private choice for any-
one but the mother is not a good argument, and will increasingly
come to be seen as such.
Finally, as was the case regarding liberal equality doctrine and
the denial of difference, the denial of connection at the heart of liber-
alism’s commitment to individualism carries with it an opportunity
cost: the lost opportunity to make arguments for these freedoms, not
on the basis of the inconsequentiality for others, but rather on the
basis of the good they do. If pornography is to receive First Amend-
ment protection, or if surrogacy contracts are to be allowed by law, or
if birth control is to be protected by our right to privacy, it must be
because of the value of some pornography, of the good done by surro-
gacy contracts, and of the improvement in the quality of life for par-
ents and children alike, facilitated by family planning. I do not know
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whether any of these arguments are ultimately successful; I suspect
maybe in the case of pornography, probably not in the case of surro-
gacy, and very likely so in the case of birth control and planned par-
enthood. However, the liberal denial of the insularity of all of these
decisions mutes them all.
By its hegemonic insistence on the inconsequentiality of fetal life
and, hence, the unproblematic privacy of the decision to abort, the
profoundly liberal pro-choice movement, I would caution, runs the
risk of muffling some of the stronger arguments for reproductive
rights that have emerged over the last ten years. Eileen McDonagh
recently argued that the consequence of conceding, indeed insisting,
on the humanity of the fetus is that not only would the right to abort
be placed on a surer footing, but so also would abortion funding.56 Al-
though we may all—born and unborn alike—have a constitutionally
protected right to life, none of us enjoys a right so unconditional as to
be guaranteed access to the organs, bodily fluids, and bodily support
of another without that person’s consent.57 For example, a born child
does not enjoy such a right against his father—and if a grown child
in need of a kidney tried to assert such a right against his non-
consenting father, the state in the exercise of its police power would
be inclined to come to the aid of the father and to prevent such an as-
sault. Why is the situation of the pre-born child any different? Why is
this child, but not the born child, permitted unlimited use of his
mother’s body without her consent? The father was no less involved
in the creation of the grown child than the mother was involved in
the creation of the fetus. Again, no one else enjoys such a right, and
we all expect our police to protect us from those who would assert it.
I do not aim, here, to convince you of this provocative thesis. How-
ever, I do want to suggest that this argument, as well as others that
assert the human status of fetal life, deserves a hearing. They are
important, meritorious defenses of the right to abort that have the
distinctive virtue of not counterfactually denying the connection of
the mother to the life growing within her. They also, in turn, have
the virtue of clarifying why the decision to abort, while it must be le-
gally protected, is often morally repugnant. While we all support the
legality of the father’s decision not to donate a kidney or even blood
to his child who will die without it, we are also morally appalled by
his refusal to do so. Surely the same should be the case of the abort-
ing mother whenever her decision to terminate the fetal life within
her is not relatively strongly compelled: while the decision must be
legally protected, it should also be morally condemned. Acknowledg-
ment of the need for both legal protection and moral condemnation
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follows directly from an acknowledgment of the fetus’s human status.
The pro-choice movement stifles these arguments, I fear, to the det-
riment of the embattled right the movement aims to defend.
IV.   SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PROBLEMS AND PROMISE
Let me quickly apply these observations to the promise and poten-
tial pitfalls of liberal defenses of same-sex marriage, or liberal legal
attacks on laws prohibiting the same. I do not mean to suggest a uni-
formity within either the gay and lesbian community or their advo-
cates where there is none. There is tremendous internal division over
the merits of marriage as an institution, the desirability of entering
into it, the efficacy of asserting a right to do so at this point in our
history, and the meaning of it all—to say nothing of the strengths
and weaknesses of particular constitutional or legal arguments as-
serting the right itself. Nevertheless, at least a liberal legal consen-
sus of sorts is emerging, and it is one that, I suspect, will carry all of
the problems of liberal legalism I have tried to identify here, and
then some.
The argument is straightforward. Same-sex and opposite sex mar-
riages are in all legally relevant ways identical. They would serve
comparable needs for intimacy and stability, and they would entail
comparable rights, duties, and liabilities in the various areas of law
that impact family life. The only difference between them lies in the
sex of the spouse, but this difference is simply immaterial—in all im-
portant or essential respects that matter, the union is of the same
sort. Gay men and lesbians, in Andrew Sullivan’s liberal formulation
of the point, are “virtually normal” in all ways relevant to law.58
From this claim of sameness follows a straightforward equal pro-
tection claim. The state’s denial of a marriage license to two women
seeking to marry is impermissible discrimination. There is simply no
difference, on this account, as the Hawaii Supreme Court has held,
between a woman’s decision to marry a man—fully protected as a
fundamental right—and a woman’s decision to marry a woman.59 The
only difference, again, is in the sex of the intended spouse, and that
is a difference of no consequence. To differentiate between them—
protecting the former and disallowing the latter—is therefore
impermissible because it is based on irrational discrimination.60
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The liberty argument, although not yet elaborated in case law, is
not hard to imagine. The right of the individual to marry within his
sex is covered by the same right of privacy that protects the individ-
ual’s right to marry outside his race, to take birth control, or to pro-
cure an abortion. It goes to the heart of our right to make fundamen-
tal decisions regarding our individual lives. It is quintessentially self-
regarding behavior, a clear-cut example of conduct that is simply no
one’s business but one’s own. Expanding the freedom to marry impli-
cates essentially no negative externalities and would constitute a
dramatic expansion of individual liberty. Accordingly, it is a para-
digmatic freedom that ought to be, and hence is, protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Let me first address the assumption of sameness and the denial of
difference at the heart of the equal protection argument. I will skip
over, or leave to your imagination, the ways in which the assertion of
bland sameness may backfire, and focus instead on the opportunity
costs inherent in the denial of differences between opposite and
same-sex marriage. My claim, briefly, is that there are at least two
such differences that, if recognized, could ground an argument for
gay marriage that could transform the cultur, in a badly needed and
profoundly liberal direction.
The first difference is that same-sex marriage, unlike traditional
marriage, has never been predicated on the presumed desirability of
subordinating the female sex. There is no record in the history of
same-sex marriage of a “marital rape exemption” according to which
one of the partners is entitled to sex on demand, regardless of the
consent or desire of the other. There is no expectation on the part of
those contemplating same-sex marriage, as there still is with vast
numbers of individuals contemplating traditional marriage, that one
partner is privileged to demand sex and the other obligated to pro-
vide it. There is no cultural construct, in other words, of marital
roles, obligations, and identities constituted by an axis of subordina-
tion, in turn constituted by legally privileged sexual violence. This is
a difference that matters, and it matters a lot.
The difference is important because it carries the promised poten-
tial to transform the very institution of marriage itself into a truly
liberal and even egalitarian institution. Should same-sex marriage
ever become a reality in this culture, it would “normalize” the ideal of
a for-life union between sexual equals. It would allow us an opportu-
nity to glimpse the possibility of marital life freed of the illiberal,
nonegalitarian, and unfree heritage of the institution’s deeply patri-
archal past. For liberalism to deny that opportunity in the name of
formal equality is more than just perverse, although it is surely that.
It is also self-defeating. In this instance, denial of difference is a de-
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nial, not an affirmation, of liberalism’s deepest egalitarian and liber-
tarian impulses.
The second difference between traditional and same-sex marriage
is the difference emphasized by conservatives, and particularly by
the natural lawyer, John Finnis: same-sex marriage, unlike tradi-
tional marriage, would legitimate and sanctify non-reproductive sex
acts instead of reproductive sex acts. For Finnis, this difference is fa-
tal because such non-reproductive sex acts are paradigmatically im-
moral.61
Liberals, and most persuasively, Stephen Macedo, have responded
true to form by denying the difference. Macedo argues that the dif-
ferences between the non-reproductive sex acts of a same-sex couple
and the non-reproductive sex acts of a sterile, post-menopausal, or
heterosexual couple using birth control are surely insignificant.62
Macedo’s point is obviously well-taken. However, here again, we
should at least hesitate before insisting so strenuously on sameness
in the face of this apparent difference. There may be a relevant dif-
ference between a marriage that sanctifies paradigmatically non-
reproductive sexual acts and paradigmatically reproductive ones.
Further, it may even be a difference that matters morally, but cuts
the opposite way of that suggested by Finnis. Reproductive sex acts
model a form of physically caring for the other in a marriage that ei-
ther carries the potential for, or at least symbolizes in the conserva-
tive imagination, biological reproduction—an event that, when it oc-
curs, demands considerable altruism, at least on the part of the
mother. But it is also an event that, at least as sociobiologists never
tire of reminding us, is through and through selfish on a genetic and
evolutionary scale.
The care we bestow on family members genetically linked to us
carries the same paradoxical quality. We might want to consider the
possibility that the non-reproductive sex act sanctified by a legal, re-
ligious, and socially recognized same-sex marriage between two indi-
viduals committed to the care of each other and no less committed
than their heterosexual counterparts to the possibility of raising
children, presents a model of caring that, precisely because it does
not embed the giving of physical care in a genetic replication, is less
constrained by egoism. It is often observed—and quite rightly—that
our capacity for care ebbs and flows depending on the strength or
weakness of the genetic link between the subject and object of care-
giving. The creation of a social institution defined by love-making not
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aimed toward genetic replication, but nevertheless aimed toward
care, might at least expand our imaginative understanding of the
limits and promise of the affective source of this communal, connec-
tive ethic.
I will be much more brief regarding liberty. There is just no good
reason, and much to be lost, by denying the communitarian and
communal nature of marriage, and hence of gay marriage. It is also
unnecessary. There is nothing in the liberal regard for individual
autonomy that commits liberalism to the false claim that marriage is
an individualistic institution designed to enhance the autonomy of
consenting adults by permitting them to contract with each other for
sex, affection, and mutual support. Marriage just is, through and
through, anti-individualistic. That is precisely its moral strength,
and to no small measure the source of its immense appeal.
Advocates of gay marriage in particular, outside of a dubious loy-
alty to liberalism, have no reason to deny this. First, gay unions have
the potential to be significantly better as communities than their
heterosexual counterparts. They may be just as violent, oppressive,
suffocating, boring, tedious, or dreary, but they simply are not as
vulnerable to the disabling and destructive possibilities of rape, legal
and otherwise.63 Second, they share with heterosexual unions the re-
demptive potential to transform the individual into a person whose
self-regarding preferences and desires are defined communally, and
that is a morally desirable, not undesirable, transformation of self-
regard and identity. Third, the impact of these marriages on the
larger culture would surely be for the good. Aside from the obvious
benefits to gay and lesbian citizens themselves, the availability and
legality of gay marriage would strengthen heterosexual marriages as
well, leaving them more voluntary, less compulsory, more egalitar-
ian, and for all of these reasons considerably more liberal.
V.   CONCLUSION
Let me conclude by noting that the liberal denial of difference and
connection, in the area of gay marriage, and in the name of equality
and liberty respectively, leaves in its wake one additional opportu-
nity cost of a somewhat peculiar theoretical nature. In this culture
and at this time, we desperately need a reinvigorated and open dia-
logue regarding the point of marriage, of married life, and of marital
sex. If feminism continues to influence culture in the next century—
as it has in the one now ending—then the point of that institution
will no longer be, as it was for so much of the last millennium, to
order social relations and life through subordinating the female sex.
If liberalism holds its ground, nor will its point be the conception and
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rearing of children—so long as there are individuals who badly want
to marry but have no desire or ability to parent. But nor can the
point of marriage be what large numbers of liberals and libertarians
are now arguing: that marriage is a contract, no different in essence
from any other, designed to efficiently coordinate complementary
preferences and to maximize wealth and efficiency for all. Marriage
cannot be merely a contract for the straightforward reason that if it
becomes that it will wither away.
This leaves a void. What is the point of marriage? One possible
answer, I think, is raised by the possibility and promise of gay mar-
riage. It is also an old argument, dating at least from Kierkegaard.
The point of marriage, in theory as well as in our private lives, may
be to provide a structure within which we learn to define and con-
tinually redefine ourselves as caring rather than egoistic beings—as
connected to rather than alienated from the concerns and well-being
of others.64 If so, then the central point of marriage would indeed be
shared by gay and straight marriage alike. It is a shared trait, how-
ever, and a common essence that only comes into focus, and can only
come into focus, when the transformative difference gay marriage
might make in the institution itself is highlighted, not obscured. It is
by highlighting difference, in other words, that we might discard the
institution’s ignoble but ultimately inessential heterosexual and mi-
sogynist past. By blurring or denying those differences, the liberal
advocate, perversely, obscures the very universality among us that,
entirely to his credit, he relentlessly seeks to foster.
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